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 The themes of Pierre Macherey’s most recent books have 
already occasioned a certain surprise among readers. The fact that he 
has devoted his most recent, and longest, works to the themes of the 
quotidian and the utopian, appears to offer something of a paradox. 
After all, a philosopher who worked closely with Louis Althusser for 
nearly twenty years and who is now justly regarded as one of the most 
important Spinoza scholars in the world today, might, from a certain 
perspective at least, be expected to regard these themes with the 
suspicion, if not disdain, for which his “hyper-critical” generation was 
famous. How then do we address Macherey’s recent turn to the 
questions of the quotidian and utopia, a turn all the more surprising 
in that unlike so many of his contemporaries he has renounced 
nothing of his past, and expressed neither guilt nor regret about his 
association with Althusser? 
But another and perhaps more important paradox, in that it is not 
merely biographical, consists precisely of the association of the 
quotidian and the utopian which, after all, constitute antithetical 
ways of grasping reality and imply very different strategies for its 
transformation. Does not the very imperative to take the ordinary as 
an object of inquiry confer upon it an importance, if not a value, of 
which utopian thought seeks to deprive it in its insistence on a 
negation of the existing world in favor of the world to come, as if the 
former could only ever be a degraded version of the latter? In the 
same way, would not  the turn towards the particularized solidity of 
the everyday involve a redirection of critical energies away from that 
which is not (yet) and a renunciation, if not an active devaluation, of 
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an orientation to a beyond-the –present, even if it offers itself as a 
present-in-waiting, the next present, if not the next world? 
For those who know Macherey’s work, these paradoxes can be neither 
surprising nor particularly disconcerting. His thought, and one can 
see it clearly in his immediately recognizable prose style, operates by 
means of paradox, not as a method or form that it would apply from 
the outside on a given philosophical doctrine, but the paradox that it 
must embody in order to grasp any doctrine. Thus, Macherey, once 
reputed to be among Hegel’s severest critics, and not only as part of 
the collective that produced Lire le Capital, but even more as the 
author of Hegel ou Spinoza who was forced to explain that he had not 
intended to contrast a bad Hegel with a good Spinoza, has in fact 
appropriated and put to work one of Hegel’s most enduring 
postulates: that a philosophy can be understood only on the basis of 
its constitutive contradictions, the antagonisms proper to it that make 
it what it is. To read the texts in which the themes of “utopia” or “the 
quotidian” take shape is to intervene within them to make visible the 
not only the antagonism between the utopian and the non-utopian, 
but even more, between the utopian and the more than utopian, the 
excess of utopia that returns to discompose the text, or between the 
quotidian and the quotidian of the quotidian, that is, the quotidian 
not opposed to the essential, but to another quotidian from which it 
must demarcate itself, perhaps its utopian residue. Is it too much to 
say that Macherey has also confronted the anti-utopian tendency that 
continues from Spinoza to Althusser with the history of its own 
repressed utopianism and, equally, to see in distance that it 
frequently takes from the quotidian a certain symptomatic value that 
remains to be analyzed? 
Both books can be read as a history of “l’errance du concept,” a 
machereyan version or perhaps specification of Cavaillès’s imperative 
to produce a “philosophy of the concept” instead of a “philosophy of 
consciousness.”   Thus, Macherey refuses to consider the quotidian 
and the utopian outside of the textual and even stylistic forms in 
which alone these concepts have their existence. The absence of a 
logic of the quotidian or the utopian outside of and prior to its 
realization in the works devoted to it, each of which would be 
measured by the degree of its deviation from this logic, compels us to 
understand these concepts in their historicity, which is anything but a 
linear progression or regression. Shaped by histories, by struggles, 
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they cannot master, even in thought, these concepts always appear in 
singular forms which together constitute  the “quotidian” or the 
utopian, a greater singularity which the complexity of history 
necessarily deprives of any finality. To follow the meanderings of a 
concept is perhaps another way of conceiving what Althusser, 
following Spinoza, called deviation without a norm and error without 
truth. In each of its moments the concept appears in its fragility, as if 
it were always ready to become something other than itself, as if it 
were struggling to ward off a contagion with which it had already 
been infected or afflicted with that allergy by which it attacks itself 
with the aim of rejecting the other. To follow a concept in its errance 
is to discover that the very means by which it seeks itself, its truth, is 
the means of its own evasion, as if it could exist only by fleeing itself. 
It is this “fuite en avant,” by which the concept chases its own identity 
before it, that Macherey traces with extraordinary precision in these 
two major works. 
  
Accordingly, Macherey’s examination of the quotidian in Petits riens: 
ornières et dérives du quotidien begins with the three philosophers, 
Pascal, Hegel and Marx, whose work might be and has been read as 
its most violent condemnation. Pascal never ceased to speak of the 
“vanity” or nothingness of the everyday life, composed of the trivial 
occupations that men pursue even as their destiny is being wagered. 
But it was precisely in reaction against Descartes, that proud 
philosopher who imagined that he could disencumber himself of the 
quotidian whose impressions were no more real than the dreams he 
so often had but from which he always awoke, to discover the starting 
point of certain knowledge. Certainty: it was this that led to the 
devaluation of the necessarily uncertain and wavering world of 
experience. Pascal’s rejection of this quest led to his assertion that we 
remained confined to the quotidian not as a prison we might dream of 
escaping, but as the environment outside of which we could not exist. 
If it was our environment, however, it was not one in which we could 
ever be at home. The proper of the human condition was to be 
deprived of the property that would make it what it is, to be 
condemned to restlessness and “ennui:” although we cannot achieve 
certainty, we cannot bear uncertainty; we seek that which we can 
never have and cannot be content with what by nature is our share.  
The quotidian then is not reducible to a world of illusion; rather it is 
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the point at which the sacred divides from the profane, the infinite 
from the finite and the eternal from the temporal, that is, not a point 
in space at all, but a gap, a void that exists inside as well as outside of 
man. Pascal is not content to stop his analysis here, but goes on to 
theorize the practices by which men seek to escape, if only always 
temporarily, the misery proper to a state without stable properties, 
which thus is not even a state or condition, but rather its absence: the 
forms of divertissement. Here, Pascal’s theology prevents him from 
merely condemning diversion. What concupiscence of pride would 
allow anyone to declare when, where and on whom God’s 
unforeseeable grace will descend? It may be that diversion itself 
which, as its name suggests, is a turning away or deviation from what, 
for Pascal, is already itself deviant, can lead if not to grace then to an 
illumination of the nature of grace: the roulette wheel, no less than 
the crucifix, reminds us that our salvation is already wagered, the 
exaltation and disappointment to which it gives rise dim 
foreshadowings of the ecstasy or, more probably, the terror to come. 
If we are surprised to learn that Pascal produces a theory of the 
positivity (however paradoxical)  of everyday life, what can be said 
about Hegel, for whom Spirit has at the outset, that is, before it was 
itself, lost itself in otherness, the forms of existence whose negation 
and assimilation into Spirit constitute that mediation of itself with 
itself in the form of an Absolute understood as activity rather than 
inert being? Here, to answer this question, Macherey takes us into the 
heart of Hegelian idealism, or rather to its outermost limit, the point 
at which it threatens to become (or to discover that it already is), as 
Lenin noted in his study of Der Logik der Wissenschaft, 
indistinguishable from a materialism, the point where absolute 
transcendence and absolute immanence coincide. 
Macherey takes as his point of entry the famous phrase “die List der 
Vernunft” or the ruse of reason, especially as Hegel explains it in 
Section 209 (together with the Zusätze—or supplementary student 
notes—appended to the section) of the Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences, Part I. Here, Hegel’s focus is on the notion of 
teleology, specifically its role in the doctrine of the concept (die Lehre 
vom Begriff), the very notion that would appear to condemn everyday 
life to the status of appearance or the middle term of the syllogism by 
which Reason posits itself, that is, the means by which Reason 
realizes its ends and as such is itself subject to the violence of the 
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labor of the negative. Macherey, however, shows that in this 
particular passage Hegel seems to suggest that Reason achieves its 
ends not through a violent dismembering of the things that constitute 
the present, but rather by withdrawing into itself to allow things and 
people, by the actions proper to them and without its interference, to 
realize the rational end which they neither know nor desire by “acting 
upon and wearing each other away (abreibt und aufhebt),” that is, not 
simply through an abstract “overcoming” of their difference, but an 
almost physical grinding off of the features that prevent them from 
acting in concert (and the physicality implied by the verb “abreiben” 
is noteworthy here).  In this sense, Reason’s ends are not external to 
everyday life, but immanent within it. The quotidian is no longer the 
means which, once the end is accomplished, will pass away, but is the 
necessary component of the process by which Reason produces itself. 
The quotidian is thus not only not a realm of appearance, but even as 
the form by which Reason is mediated with itself, becomes part of the 
self-production of the Absolute and as such a full participant in 
passionate disorder of the True. Thus, Hegel appears to have negated 
the negation of everyday life and to have restored it to its importance 
not as the inert reality understood by the empirical sciences, but as a 
concrete existence in motion through which the real becomes itself. 
The notion of the ruse of reason has fascinated many of Hegel’s 
readers and perhaps none more than Marx. As Engels put in his 
retrospective survey of German philosophy (Ludwig Feuerbach, 
1888), all the contradictions, political as well as philosophical, of the 
notion became visible in the light of Hegel’s statement in the 
Philosophy of Right that “all that is rational is real and all that is real 
is rational.” On the one hand, it is an announcement of a philosophy 
of immanence, if not a materialism: “since philosophy is the 
exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason the apprehension 
of the present and the actual, and not the erection of a beyond.” Hegel 
here appears to see everyday life (the present and the actual) as the 
determinate and thus sole form of the rational. To speak of an excess 
or a beyond would mark the failure of that apprehension that is 
philosophy’s vocation. On the other hand, however, as Macherey 
notes, the real is relegated to the status of an “instrument of the 
realization of the rational,” and thus deprived of its “capacity to find 
its own end within itself” (PR 80). It was within this contradiction 
that the movement known as the Young Hegelians took shape and 
sought to eliminate the theological element that persisted in Hegel in 
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favor of “an anthropology of ordinary life attentive to all the forms of 
human activity” (PR 94). With Feuerbach in particular the 
theological, abstract remainder had to be restored to the concrete 
man from whom it came, to make him whole and return to him his 
own proper grandeur which in its alienated form had tormented him 
with the idea of his own insignificance. For the young Marx, 
Feuerbach risked creating a new religion, a religion of man, but man 
as “species-being,” an abstraction “cut off from his historico-social 
determinations, from the ‘relations’ that were at once the conditions 
and the products of his activity” (PR 100-101). Marx would thus 
declare that one cannot “suppress” or “overcome” (aufheben) 
philosophy without realizing (verwerklichen) it. This critique of 
Feuerbach which, as Macherey notes, is very Hegelian, demands the 
absolute coincidence of philosophy and reality, a coincidence that can 
only come about as the result of practice, a practice moreover carried 
out in the most trivial yet necessary acts of everyday life, the acts by 
which we feed and clothe ourselves.  
These philosophical reflections, which often constituted the 
unthought and the overlooked residue of philosophers who were 
typically read as condemning everyday life to the status of mere 
appearance, succeeded in opening “a new space” (PR 12).  While the 
discovery and occupation of continent of the ordinary  is usually 
credited to the phenomenological movement which in its own way 
and in often paradoxical forms took on the existence of a 
philosophical anthropology, even and perhaps especially, when it 
sought to contest humanism, Macherey shows that it was not the only 
one to occupy and claim this terrain. While the notion of 
intentionality introduced by Brentano and developed by Husserl 
seemed to overcome the opposition of consciousness and world, it 
tended in its various forms to leave the terms of this opposition 
intact. This was not the case with the developments in the human 
sciences which took the quotidian as an object, even a privileged 
object, of inquiry. 
Thus, for Freud in the Psychopathology of Everyday Life, there can be 
no question of an originary correlation  between consciousness and 
world; in fact, everyday life (Alltagslebens) is the element in which 
consciousness comes to know itself as pathological. Only through the 
analysis of its pathologies is consciousness is knowable at all, as if 
pathology were its normal state.  The specific pathology that concerns 
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Freud here, however, neither manifests itself as, nor can be studied at 
the level of the spectacular forms of madness or “mental illness,” even 
if it is not entirely unrelated to them. Just as during Freud’s lifetime, 
the development of the microscope permitted the detection of 
diseases at the cellular level, so the psychoanalyst had to take as his 
object the “trivial” and “ephemeral” acts of daily life that had 
previously existed below the threshold of scientific visibility and 
regarded as constituting a realm of the purely contingent which, 
outside of any causal explanation, would remain as unintelligible as it 
was insignificant. The pathologies which Freud identified in his work 
hardly seemed worthy of the name: the “actes-manqués,” the slips, 
the episodes of the forgetting of words or proper names, all seemed 
nothing more than lapses in attention or the result of some 
momentary distraction that for an instant interrupted the activity of 
the mind. And yet he not only declared these “sub-events,” these 
“parapraxes” explicable in causal terms (noting thereby, as Lacan 
constantly reminded us, the paranoiac nature of knowledge), but also 
declared the primacy of consciousness’s division not from the world 
but from itself. It was here at the “cellular” level of “Alltagslebens” 
that consciousness discovered itself in its own pathologies, as if 
consciousness were woven from the effects of the truth, its truth, 
against which its entire existence was a defense. 
For Macherey,  Georg Simmel, Freud’s contemporary whose 
Metropolis and Mental Life was published around the same time as 
Freud’s Psychopathology,  similarly advanced the notion of the 
intelligibility of ordinary life, applying to this notion in order to be 
able to take a critical distance from the dominant conception of  
society, as well as perhaps, if in a less obvious way, of the individual. 
Here too, optical images are critical: one must observe society as if 
through a magnifying glass (à la loupe) or microscope: “for it is the 
only way to detect, by placing oneself in the perspective of a society in 
the process of making itself, the diverse ways it effectively weaves its 
texture or its living tissue” (PR 133-134). For the sociologist to fix his 
gaze upon the hypostatized institutions and apparatuses, the state, 
the economy, and the military, in which society recognizes itself, is to 
miss the flows of energy or information, the exchanges not of money 
or property, but of words, glances and gestures, the movements that 
obey neither a calculus of self-interest, nor the rules and rituals of 
organizations, the thousand moments of daily contact. It is here that a 
society is made, the durability of its very fabric the product of 
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numberless minimal encounters and relations. Simmel could ask the 
question “what is society?” because for him “society as such, ‘in itself,’ 
does not exist except as a substantialist illusion nourished by a 
naively realist scientistic objectivism” (PR  ). For the same reason, 
Simmel rejects the notion of the autonomous individual, another 
abstraction from the infinite variations of the “interindividual” in 
which relations and reciprocal actions make possible the forms of 
individuality (or being-in-society) rather than the inverse. The proper 
object of sociology is not a thing, society, but an action, that of 
socialization in which innumerable quotidian practices conjoin to 
produce the forms of being-in-society. Does this mean that to follow 
Simmel’s protocol would be to turn away from the most dramatic and 
troubling social problems in favor of micro-studies that by definition 
can never be summarized except in the form of a fictional unity that 
cannot even account for its own existence? On the contrary, Simmel 
produced one of the most striking accounts of a mode of being-in-
society that could be imagined, a mode whose consequences would be 
enormous: that of the stranger, the one who is both inside and out 
and who is constituted by the forms of reciprocal actions as the 
internal outside. Because the stranger is a product and an effect, 
anyone may become a stranger and in relation to nearly any kind of 
action and relation. But over everything there looms a great darkness, 
as if socialization in Simmel’s sense has become in the modern era the 
perpetual production of strangers, and soon, of the stranger as 
internal enemy whose existence is incompatible with our own.   Thus, 
Simmel’s extraordinary accomplishment was to show how from the 
instability and mobility of relations which determined the forms of 
both individuality and interindividuality one could explain some of 
history’s most decisive events. 
The sole representative of the phenomenological tradition in 
Macherey’s account of the quotidian is the neglected figure, Alfred 
Schutz. Often wrongly regarded and dismissed as a sectarian of 
Husserlian phenomenology whose objective was to guard and tend to 
the concepts elaborated by Husserl, Macherey shows that, on the 
contrary, Schutz’s project of opening phenomenology to sociology 
compelled him to admit that “Husserl’s attempt to ground the 
constitution of intersubjectivity on the basis of the conscious 
operations of the transcendental Ego did not succeed” (PR 164). For 
Schutz, even the late Husserl, the Husserl of the Krisis failed to move 
beyond the sphere of “egologie,” sketched out in the fifth Cartesian 
8
Décalages, Vol. 1 [2014], Iss. 3, Art. 10
https://scholar.oxy.edu/decalages/vol1/iss3/10
Meditation in which a given ego comes to experience an other, or 
more precisely an alter-ego. Husserl from this perspective, cannot 
move from the world understood as “a collection of I (s) or ego(s)” to 
the genuine community of a “we.” The notion of Lebenswelt is 
understood as the collection of I-you relations in which you are 
assumed to be essentially like me in that it is my experience of myself 
that allows me to experience you as an alter-ego, another I, like me. 
Schutz begins to question this conception of sociality not by asserting 
the existence of a society as a substance of which individuals would be 
so many attributes, but by disrupting the I-you relation itself. He does 
by recourse to the concept of the stranger, and not simply the 
stranger to me (as in the admonition to children not “to talk to 
strangers”), but the stranger of Scripture, the stranger in a strange 
land, the foreigner, immigrant, exile, refugee that Schutz himself was 
when he wrote his article on “The Stranger” in the middle of the 
Second World War. Not all alter egos are equivalent and 
interchangeable; the self-other relation is mediated by a primary 
division between the other who is like me (precisely the meaning of 
the biblical “neighbor” or “prochain” in Hebrew) or the one who is not 
like me, that is, the stranger. But Schutz goes even further: in an essay 
published immediately after “The Stranger,” he examines the case of 
the one who, having been away, returns home, not only to familiar 
surroundings but to those who are like him, his neighbors and 
friends. “The Homecomer” (based on the observation of Army 
veterans returning from the war in the US), discovers the fragility of 
the home, the neighbor and even of the “I” itself, all of which have 
changed, effacing any meaningful distinction between stranger and 
homecomer. Neither the ego nor alter ego are the same, as if social 
existence were a process of “devenir-étranger,” or a becoming-
stranger, whose most immediate and powerful effect is, as in Freud’s 
analysis of everyday life, the experience of becoming strange to 
oneself.  We might think of that great poet of the quotidian, 
Baudelaire, who, in “Le Cynge,” describes the experience of becoming 
an exile by remaining in the same place as the world changes around 
him. 
As one might expect of Macherey, it is in the realm of literature that 
the question of the quotidian is most urgently posed and everyday 
life, rescued from the oblivion of neglect by psychoanalysis and 
sociology, emerges as a continent to be explored. No European 
literary work prior to the Second World War so assiduously, even 
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obsessively, adjusted the microscope to examine the heretofore 
ignored, repressed, or even invisible minutiae of everyday life than 
James Joyce’s Ulysses first published in in its entirety in 1922. A 
contemporary of both Freud and Simmel who was disdainful of the 
former and apparently ignorant of the latter, Joyce was nevertheless 
their objective ally. In what might be described as a kind of hyper-
realism, he devotes nearly 75 pages (of the French edition) to each 
hour, one page to each minute and one line to each second in the life 
of Leopold Bloom, his wife, Molly and her lover, Stephen Dedalus. 
Life, not lives: while Joyce’s technique, often called the internal 
monologue or stream of consciousness, appears to capture the inner 
world of his characters, it in fact effaces the distinction between 
Innenwelt and Umwelt, and thus between one inner world and 
another, suggesting a world in which the boundaries between egos are 
permeable, if they exist at all. In Ulysses the supposedly inescapable 
order of grammar is suspended and replaced by a series of fragments, 
elisions and contractions which, astonishingly, are perfectly 
intelligible because they represent a scrupulous transcription of 
quotidian language. The suspension of punctuation in the last 
segment of the novel, including a final period, marks a refusal of 
formal closure, and more importantly, of an end, that telos towards 
which every detail should have directed the narrative. This is all the 
more striking in that Joyce very openly refers the reader to the 
Odyssey whose episodes are repeated in the peregrinations of Bloom 
who like Odysseus returns home, to the point of origin. But Joyce 
before Schutz has already explored the inescapability of the 
stranger/homecomer position: Bloom, a Jewish convert to 
Protestantism and then to Catholicism, is a stranger in a strange land 
who escapes his estrangement by exiling himself from his own exile. 
Similarly, his homecoming is not a return even to a point of origin in 
space. It is not the home that it was: he has been displaced. 
Generations of critics, including T.S. Eliot, have insisted on the 
reference to the Odyssey as an ordering device in what would 
otherwise become a “heap of broken images,” to cite a line from 
Eliot’s “Wasteland.”  But is the quotidian merely an unintelligible pile 
of “petits riens” or little nothings without significance in the absence 
of a superior instance, namely myth, that would confer order upon it? 
Macherey is not so sure: “What has Joyce actually done? Has he 
mythologized the quotidian in such a way as to reveal its unimagined 
and generally unrecognized potentialities or has he quotidianized 
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myth by confining it to the banality of the novel’s narrative, thus 
treacherously deflating its pretensions? (PR187). In fact, if anything 
the movement of Ulysses appears to reveal (epiphany was one of 
Joyce’s keywords) a sacred so incarnate in the profane, a universal so 
dispersed among singularities, that the very notion of an order of 
everyday life can only be understood as the form of disorder proper to 
it.   
Surrealism, of course, represented a response to the same imperative 
to explore the heretofore unknown and in an important sense 
uncolonized and therefore savage world of everyday life which had 
long been the Antarctica of philosophical and political reflection: 
huge and unexplored, but regarded as not worth the effort. Macherey 
examines two of surrealism’s most important trajectories: that 
associated with André Breton and the Surrealist International and 
that of one of surrealism’s most compelling dissidents: anthropologist 
Michel Leiris.  According to Erich Auerbach in his great work,  
Mimesis, the emergence of literary realism was predicated on a 
general secularization and, to use, Weber’s phrase, disenchantment of 
the world. The disappearance of a transcendental realm in which the 
world’s truth would be contained, was not merely a subtraction that 
left the world less than it was before, as Hegel argued in his critique of 
the Enlightenment. On the contrary, it allowed the emergence of 
entire realms that had remained obscured by the shadows cast by 
religion. But the surrealist relation to such realism was profoundly 
critical; to write about the quotidian was insufficient and in fact 
suspect. One had to enter the ordinary and, as if “to write” had to be 
understood as a transitive verb, to write it rather than passively 
describe it. If such a position seems to suggest the necessity of 
intervening in everyday life which indeed became the privileged site 
of politico-cultural intervention, the goal of this intervention was, 
according to Macherey, to bring about its “re-enchantment.” As 
Ferdinand Alquié argued, however, this “derealization” or “re-
sacralization,” did not seek once again to degrade the world of the 
quotidian as if it were a dim emanation of something more real. If the 
surrealists seem to point to a beyond, this beyond is neither outside 
nor after everyday life; it is a quasi-sacred immanent in and 
commingled with the quotidian, as if the natural and the surnatural, 
the real and the surreal were one and the same thing. To grasp the 
way in which as Breton put it, “the other world is included in this one” 
(PR 214), the surrealists would have to carry out an “opération de 
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dynamitage” (PR 215) to explode the existing forms of experience and 
allow new ways of life. 
Leiris, who broke with Breton in the mid-twenties, called the 
experience of another world in this one the marvelous (le 
merveilleux). When chance events for no more than a moment 
suspend our normal and normalized rationality, we may glimpse 
something of the miraculous in the most routine activities. A 
literature of the marvelous will wring out of the quotidian the 
miraculous with which it is soaked through. But what is the 
marvelous if not the sign of another world? In his later work, 
especially La Régle du jeu, Leiris describes it as that precarious 
balance that constitutes human life, the sense that at any moment, for 
any reason, it could tip into nothingness. Similarly, the sacred in 
everyday life (which Macherey insists must be distinguished from the 
marvelous) consists in those symptomatic acts that Freud, to whom 
Leiris does not refer in this context, enumerates, that reveal to the self 
the outside that is internal to it, the fact that to know oneself is to 
confront the inassimilable stranger that one is and must remain to 
oneself. 
For Georges Perec writing in the 1960s and 1970s, there can be no 
epiphany, no revelation of a beyond immured in the ordinary and the 
habitual. In a series of narratives in which the forgetting of a proper 
name would appear as high drama, he systematically empties the 
ordinary of any hint of the sacred, the marvelous or the miraculous. 
Perec’s treatment of the quotidian not only does not have “the allure 
of an amplification or of a glorification,” (PR 234) but is limited to 
making an inventory of objects and events that can never be 
organized into a system of classification. His inventories, and here 
Macherey refers particularly to the Tentative d’une épuisement d’un 
lieu parisien (1975), resemble mosaics, the irreducible difference of 
whose materials never allows them to cohere into a whole. His 
descriptions, moreover, give “the impression that something is in the 
process of dissolving, like the foam on the surface of a cup of coffee, 
about which one can do nothing but passively await its 
disappearance, which nothing can prevent” (PR 233). For Perec, 
Macherey argues, to write is to save something, a memory, an image, 
a trace, from oblivion by at the same time leaving an indelible mark, 
perhaps like a tattoo on a forearm, for someone else in another 
context, another world, to decipher as they will. Why the urgency to 
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memorialize the cellophane candy wrapper blown by the wind around 
the Place Saint-Sulpice, at 17:10, 18 October, 1974? His text, Je me 
souviens (1978) offers a clue. Perec writes as if driven by a need to 
record every memory before it disappears forever. To remember (a 
reflexive verb in French) all those things that threaten to pass away 
unnoticed is to remember himself, to recollect himself in every sense 
of the word, as if he himself were dispersed among the broken 
images, shattered signs and part-objects that fill the Paris street on 
any given day. Macherey notes here that memories conceal other 
memories, memories of absence or simply the absent memories they 
gradually become.  Thus, Perec’s recourse to the lipogram in La 
disparition (1969) to memorialize absence by eliminating a letter 
whose elimination it is the writer’s job to conceal. Here, the quotidian 
is the site of a forgetting that cannot be forgotten, of unspeakable 
memories of which one cannot stop speaking, of an abyss that 
shimmers like an underground lake upon which a light has suddenly 
been cast. The stranger was here too once, his disappearance no more 
noted than that of the scrap of paper that only yesterday inched along 
the gutter. 
Thus, for Macherey, literature was able to think, to write, the 
quotidian transitively in a way that did not simply reflect upon it, but 
participated in it, as its prolongation or overflow into writing, 
allowing or even compelling us, to the extent that we entered its 
discourse, to share this thought. If in this sense literature produced a 
kind of knowledge, it was something like Spinoza’s third kind of 
knowledge in which the singular and the universal are one and the 
same thing. It is all the more striking then that in the final section of 
Petits riens the same cannot be said of the “critical approaches” 
Macherey examines: those of Barthes, Lefebvre, Debord and de 
Certeau. In a very important sense, these are critiques in both sense 
of the word:  they explain the quotidian, but they do so in a way that 
identifies, if not denounces, it as dependent on something more real 
than itself, which the quotidian both alludes to and denies. We have 
returned to the point of departure: Hegel and the ruse of Reason. The 
literary texts discussed by Macherey insisted on the irreducible 
materiality of the quotidian: the marvelous, the sacred and the 
beautiful were consubstantial with the most sordid forms of matter 
and even absence, so central to Perec, remained present in the form 
of an indelible trace, the trace of writing.  
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In opposition, for Barthes in the collection, Mythologies, everyday life 
has been mythologized and thus derealized: everywhere history, that 
which is created by human labor and human struggle, is placed under 
the sign of nature, and the mutable becomes the immutable. The 
worst forms of exploitation and colonial domination became facts of 
nature that nothing could change. As that which must remain as it is, 
Nature was experienced as the obvious, that which “goes without 
saying,” and therefore does not require, or indeed permit, analysis. To 
de-mythologize the real is to describe the systems of signs, themselves 
arbitrary but organized into meaningful units, that uphold and 
“stage” myth, that produce an entire theater of pseudo-Nature. 
 The great merit of Henri Lefebvre, whose Critique de la vie quotidien 
(Critique of Everyday Life) appeared around the same time as 
Barthes’ Mythologies was to recognize in the quotidian not a system 
of deception, but that which is left over, the irreducible remainder or 
residue of human life, outside of the great structures and apparatuses 
and the mechanical behavior they demand, of social life. As such, it is 
precisely that which cannot be colonized or occupied by the forms of 
domination and exploitation that separate man from himself and 
from the results of his own activity which congeal into a world 
opposed to him. The quotidian represents that irreducible humanity 
that can never be alienated because it is inseparable from being 
human. The quotidian, or the genuinely quotidian (insofar as the 
quotidian must be a “liberated zone” in the midst of occupied 
territory) becomes the ground of disalienation. As Macherey points 
out, the effect of such a theory of quotidian was to rule out in advance 
theories of total domination as imagined by functionalist accounts of 
modern society. Here Lefebvre approaches Foucault in his insistence 
that power is always a relationship of opposing forces, rather than a 
substance. For Lefebvre, however, it was less a matter of opposing 
forces than of the opposition between the real and the possible; the 
question that remains is whether the possible is an ideal to be realized 
or on the contrary, an antagonistic tendency already inscribed in the 
real itself. 
Although he does not use the language of semiology, Guy Debord in 
The Society of the Spectacle (1967) remains close to Barthes’ 
Mythologies. The world of the Spectacle is governed by the double 
logic of fetishism, or the attribution of human agency to things, and 
reification  the tendency to view human activity and its results as 
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things. Everyday life, whose misery, was a Situationist theme, was the 
environment in which this double logic operated. Developing 
Lukacs’s notion of the increasingly contemplative and passive 
character of human life in societies in which commodity production 
has become generalized, Debord advanced idea that from the 
reciprocal action of fetishism and reification there has emerged a 
world of images and appearances which secure the reign of 
commodity production, a world like that imagined in the film, The 
Matrix: a world of illusion that feeds upon the very human labor that 
the spectacle conceals. Although Debord clearly identifies with the 
council-communist tradition of Korsch and Pannekoek, and situates 
himself in the history of the workers’ movement, everyday life 
appears so totally “spectacular” in his sense, that resistance, or the 
eruption of the real in the system of images that completely covers it 
can only take the form of an exemplary action, the creation of a   
“situation” that would disrupt the flow of images through everyday 
life and reveal the means of deception.   
Petits riens concludes with an account of Michel de Certeau’s 
L’invention du quotidian (1980), a work that Macherey insists must 
be understood in the light of de Certeau’s earlier work on mysticism 
and above all his text on the collective demonic possession at the 
Ursuline convent in Loudun 1632-40.  La possession de Loudun  
(1970) opens with a startling image of the world in which the 
phenomenon of the diabolical can emerge and flourish: it is precisely 
the image of a city street as it is invaded by floodwaters escaping their 
subterranean channels, pouring through manholes and drains, 
invading house and shops, making roads impassable and the city 
unrecognizable. This is a crisis in which the world below escapes its 
confinement and enters the world above. The mystical itself, to which 
de Certeau devoted an article in the Encyclopedia Universalis in 1968, 
was perhaps most clearly experienced in an urban setting, as if the 
world of congealed human labor were a veritable palimpsest which a 
kind of illumination, neither on the side of the subject nor the object, 
makes readable, a palimpsest in which the modern mystic can read 
the account of his own life inextricably interwoven with those of 
others. In his later work, L’invention du quotidian he found another 
kind of inner light: the quotidian was above all a place of struggles, 
not those organized around the great binary divisions, but a 
multiplicity of local struggles or practices. Drawing on Foucault, but 
moving beyond him, he preferred the realm of the tactical to that of 
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the strategic where, according to de Certeau, there is always a 
calculation of interests and outcomes. The tactical, though, is not a 
chaos of separate and fragmented practices; there too something 
inhabits them and draws them into a larger conspiracy that no one 
intended or imagined. The city is the privileged site of the quotidian: 
every attempt to regulate production as well as consumption, to 
determine the direction and velocity of movements, to distribute 
bodies in its spaces in some way falls short. It is here, in the 
interstices and moments of suspended time that resistance forms: 
depending on circumstances, it too can rise up and occupy every 
corner of the city.  
Petits riens ends with the chapter on de Certeau. What are we to 
make of the absence of a conclusion, of any attempt to summarize or 
assemble into a coherent whole the mass of material presented (not 
simply the fourteen thinkers presented, but the causes, both the 
influences and the oppositions, that determined their oeuvres), 
something readers, especially in the case of this book, would both 
expect and, even more, desire? Perhaps this is Macherey’s Brechtian 
moment (and indeed Brecht is an important reference point 
throughout the work), the moment at which the desire for closure, the 
desire to “tie things up,” to offer a conclusion that would mark the 
point at which all the disparate pieces would converge, is confronted 
with the impossibility proper to it. For what has Macherey shown us if 
not the fact that the concept of the quotidian can never quite settle 
upon itself? Something of it exceeds its grasp, as if its historical 
development were the incessant pursuit of a misrecognized part of 
itself projected into a time that is always to come and a place that is 
nowhere, as if there could be no concept of the quotidian except by 
means of its contrary: utopia.  
It is thus only in relation to the quotidian that we can begin to 
understand utopia as something other than a mere rejection of or 
flight from reality. For Macherey, if the quotidian is marked by an 
absence or lack any index of which is itself absent or lacking, the 
utopian in its way signals this lack by precisely imagining what is 
lacking, as if utopia were the missing part of the present. But it is as if 
“the road leading to the land of nowhere had itself been lost and even 
this loss itself remained unnoticed” (De L’utopie p.10). 
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Utopia thus begins with a gesture of divergence and division not from 
the real but from the forgetting by which the real denies a part of 
itself. As there exists a history of this denial in which neither its form 
nor its object remain the same, so utopia must divergence constantly 
from itself, to the point that Macherey, in nominalist fashion will 
declare there is no utopian narrative but only utopian narratives in 
the plural. The task of understanding utopian discourse must 
therefore begin by undoing the very notion of the utopian in order to 
restore it to the heterogeneity and multiplicity of utopias in the plural.  
Accordingly, Macherey begins by identifying the two fundamental 
methods by which until now the constitutive diversity of the utopian 
has been denied and “overcome:” the structural and the genetic.  He 
closely examines the most powerful versions of each method in their 
textual incarnations: Pierre- François Moreau’s Le récit utopique 
(1982) and Karl Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia (1929).  
Moreau’s structural method seeks to define the utopian genre by its 
essential attributes. The utopian narrative is defined by four 
characteristics: utopias are closed, separate, self-sufficient, usually 
situated on island or in remote areas nearly impossible to reach; 
utopian worlds are irreducibly different, not meant to be realized: the 
minute particulars with which they are described serve only to 
underscore their unrealizability; utopias are characterized by the 
administration of every aspect of social life by the state; they are 
rational: life is made uniform in order that inequalities and the 
problems they engender will cease to exist.   Every utopian text 
exhibits these characteristics; texts that do not do so cannot be called 
utopian. Not only has Moreau made utopian narratives utopian in the 
sense that they are closed, clearly and completely delimited and 
differentiated from the non-utopian, and thus secure from any danger 
of confusion or blurring of borders, but they are internally coherent, 
free from conflict or disorder.  Particularly significant is the fact that 
while utopian texts are unified theoretically prior to their 
transformation into literary form, there is no sense of the 
discrepancies and errors introduced by this “translation” or 
transcription. For Macherey, Moreau’s methodology cannot account 
for the complexity and heterogeneity of utopian texts, precisely the 
conflictuality  of a “genre” that remains open and subject to perpetual 
transformation. 
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Its apparent antithesis is Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia whose 
focus is precisely the evolution of the “figures” of Utopia from its 
origins in the German Peasant Wars of the sixteenth century and the 
discourses of Thomas Müntzer to its end in twentieth century 
communism and socialism. These figures are not simply variations on 
a theme but necessary stages in a linear sequence. In this sense he 
seems to admit a diversity that Moreau’s method would exclude.  For 
Mannheim, the origin of utopia lies not in Thomas More’s dream of a 
rational state and a paradise of legality, a singular place given the 
proper name, Utopia (in 1516), but in the chiliastic theology of 
Muntzer who sought, in joining the great peasant revolts of 1524-
1526, not an accommodation with earthly Princes, but their 
destruction and the building of a heaven on earth. “Im Anfang war die 
Tat:” Mannheim suggests that utopia is not born in the form of a 
concept or an idea, but in the deed that seeks not only to imagine a 
future but to carve out the road to it in the present. This is not merely 
a rejection of the present but a recognition that the present lacks 
something essential, something that it can only gain in becoming 
other than itself. Drawing on Ernst Bloch’s Thomas Müntzer als 
Theologe der Revolution (1921) Mannheim notes the contradiction of 
chiliastic consciousness which demands nothing less than the 
“concrete opening hic et nunc of the time to come.” To put an end to 
history, to bring about the kingdom of the just on earth is to reconcile 
transcendence and immanence and the eternal and the temporal: 
from the real negation of this movement, a new stage was born, that 
of the liberal humanitarian figure of utopia. In place of the 
“immature” demand for everything now, a demand that undoes the 
possibility of its own realization, the new figure of utopia that is the 
inverse of the first emerges. In place of the attempt to negate all that 
exists that succeeds only in negating itself, liberal utopia places 
precisely those limits on its own work that allow movement towards 
the goal, a movement it calls progress, in order not to provoke its own 
destruction.  As an inversion of the chiliastic, the liberal humanist 
utopia reproduces its contradiction by turning it upside down:  while 
the first neglected the means by which the end is achieved the second 
sees only the means and the end is perpetually deferred.  
Out of this contradiction arises the third figure, the conservative 
utopia. While as Macherey notes the phrase might seem to be an 
oxymoron insofar as it marks a reaction against the notion of 
progress. For the conservative utopia, truth is at the origin in the 
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natural condition of humankind. What others have called progress is 
nothing more than a flight from that which is proper to mankind and 
which thus can be escaped only at the cost of ever-worsening crisis. 
This too is a utopianism: the origin and fundamental principles which 
it projects into the past in one sense exist nowhere and in another are 
inscribed in the struggles of the present as a tendency seeking  to 
realize itself. Out of the contradiction of  utopianism that works 
toward an end by means that make it impossible comes the figure of 
“socialo-communism” in which the recognition that nothing less than 
a fundamentally different society can solve the problems of the 
present combines with a science of the conjuncture in which the 
apocalypse can be realized but only in the precise, always fleeting, 
moment, the kairos, in which the entire system formed by the 
multiple relations of force that constitute the present, can be tipped 
into collapse by the correct intervention. This “scientific socialism” 
does not fail to beget its contrary, modern anarchism for which even 
the idea of waiting for the correct moment of intervention is a ruse of 
reaction and a turning away from the apocalypse that must be made 
hic et nunc.  In this way, the historical evolution of utopia through a 
necessary series of stages has returned to its origin, the original 
division which no utopianism can fail to realize. Mannheim too has 
arrived at a notion of utopianism which, precisely through the 
apparent diversity of its figures closes upon itself to affirm the truth 
that utopia is an impossibility.  
Macherey thus seeks to show that between the apparently opposed 
structural and the genetic approaches there exists a complicity in that 
together they appear to exhaust the possibility of conceiving the 
utopian as anything other than a fundamental unity expressed either 
in the systematicity of the synchronic or the teleology of the 
diachronic. How then can we conceive of the utopian in its irreducible 
diversity, a diversity indistinguishable from the movement by which it 
constantly diverges from itself evading both the confines of genre and 
the implacable logic of a finality, including and above all that of the 
end of utopia?  
To begin to establish the conditions of intelligibility of the utopian 
narrative, Macherey calls our attention to the fact the More chose to 
introduce a neologism, utopia, in place of atopia which means the 
meaningless or the absurd, as the name of the political world he 
imagines. This fact serves to remind us that utopia is not simply 
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defined by its absolute dissimilarity to the present, a world beyond in 
the sense that there can be no possibility of ever reaching that world: 
“utopia is not, as would be the case, of the order of pure non-being or 
pure non-sense; it is rather related to an ought-to-be (un devoir-être) 
whose paradoxical nature is to exist as an intermediary between 
being, from which it borrows its necessity, and non-being which 
affects this necessity with something of the arbitrary without, 
however, reducing this “ought-to-be” to the status of  things null and 
void” (59). Utopia is thus less a description of an ideal than a spectral 
presence in Derrida’s sense, the specter that haunts the present 
precisely because it is no more absent than present,  because it is not 
even a potential to be realized, but the source of an uneasiness that 
can provoke the world to action. It is perhaps here that the title of 
Macherey’s book assumes its significance: not “De l’utopie, ” or “on 
Utopia” as if it consists of a representation of utopian discourse, but 
an imperative, reminding us that utopian narratives are performative 
rather than constatative, not representations of utopian ideas or 
ideals, but speech acts whose function is to move their auditors to act. 
But does not the very term “an ought-to-be” refer to the realm of the 
possible or the potential, that which should be according to norms 
external to the real but is not? Macherey refers at this point to an 
extraordinary text by Henri Bergson in which the latter argues that 
the possible is nothing but the real projecting a part of itself into the 
past as that which has not yet been realized. Thus, “the possible is a 
retroaction of the real and not its projective anticipation”(DU 71). 
What is missing from the real, the already realized, is thus what is not 
missing but overlooked, that is, repressed, or, better, split off and 
projected on to an elsewhere and another time. Utopia is often 
denounced as dangerous, because of the violence required to move 
from here to there, a violence, it is often said, that utopian discourse 
purposely omits insofar as the cost of attaining utopia would 
outweigh the benefits it could possibly offer. Macherey, in opposition, 
argues that utopia is experienced as dangerous because it brings into 
the field of vision a real already in violent conflict with itself, and, if 
utopia points to a beyond, it is a beyond already immanent in the real.  
In fact, the great anti-utopian works of the twentieth century from 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), Koestler’s Darkness at 
Noon (1941), Orwell’s 1984 (1949) to Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 
(1953), assume  that the utopias they denounce represent tendencies 
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fully present in the real, even  actually existing societies (primarily the 
USSR), whose power might allow them to impose their “visions” on 
the entire world. With the collapse of these societies and the 
transformation of China, the utopian impulse can now be seen as a 
relic of the past and utopias expressions of the illusion that another 
world, any other world, is possible. The merciless laboratory of 
history has shown not only that the good intentions of revolutionaries 
paved the road to the Hell of socialism in its real historical existence, 
but that their unintended Hell was itself doomed to perish and be 
reabsorbed into the only viable form of social, political and economic 
existence, capitalism as it existed in Europe and North America. 
It is precisely in this context that the great “classical” utopian works 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries take on their importance. 
As Moreau has argued, More’s  Utopia (1516), Campanella’s City of 
the Sun and Bacon’s New Atlantis (1626) can all be read as “romans 
d’état” in the sense that the primary agent in each of the narratives is 
neither the narrator, nor even the wise ruler, but the state and its 
laws. Macherey notes that the only events that occur in these texts are 
the entrance of the foreign narrator and the act by which the state 
comes into existence. The management, “gestion,” of these societies 
by means of a state apparatus that merely “maintains’ the laws, as one 
“maintains” a machine to insure that it functions as it should, insures 
that events which by definition mark an interruption of the existing 
system do not occur. The constant and generalized surveillance that 
such a regime requires implies the constitution of “a unified space, 
mapped out on a grid,” similar to that projected by the administrative 
apparatuses of the absolutist states of early modern Europe.  May we 
then conclude that just as these absolutist regimes were 
foreshadowings of the great totalitarian regimes of the twentieth 
century, so the utopia narratives inspired by them, were anticipations 
of the utopianism of modern communist theory?  The case seems 
more complicated: far from the disappearance of the individual and 
its absorption  by the state, the social spaces imagined in utopian 
narratives not only did not preclude a high degree of 
individualization, they fact required it. As Hobbes (whose Leviathan 
can itself be read as a utopian fiction) clearly showed, the notion of 
originally free and equal individuals in whose will alone legitimate 
sovereignty has its source in no way implies a weakening of state 
authority but may well be its most effective foundation.  The “roman 
d’état” was also, and Macherey and Moreau are in agreement here, a 
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narrative of nature, human nature and its place in the larger natural 
order, and the utopian state was defined by its acknowledgment of 
this nature. Classical utopia was, then, as Moreau argues, based upon 
a very specific “juridical anthropology.” 
It is this that allows us to expand the boundary of utopia to include 
even those works that appear anti-utopian. Mandeville’s Fable of the 
Bees for example purports to show the inevitable decline and fall of 
any society based upon a denial of the essential human attributes of 
greed and selfishness. But its postulation of human individuals driven 
to vice by their own natures but who nevertheless, without knowing 
or intending it (as Smith would later add), produce public virtue and 
prosperity can itself be regarded as utopian. By recognizing “human 
nature” and in consequence imposing limits upon itself, the state can 
by inaction produce the results that utopias produce through 
intervention. As Foucault has shown, however, states intervene by not 
intervening in times of famine or natural disaster, by abandoning the 
impoverished, the malnourished and the diseased, engaging in a kind 
of violence that does not involve weapons, but which can be just as 
deadly and at a far cheaper rate. Further the disciplinary regime he 
described developed without regard to the division between the state 
and civil society, a division that could not explain the functioning of 
power in modern societies. In the wake of the French revolution, 
Fourier, the great “Utopian socialist” from the perspective of Marx 
and Engels, was in a sense one of the first to take the struggle, so to 
speak, outside of and beyond the state, imagining what Macherey 
calls a social, opposed to political, utopia. Displacing the state from 
the center of social life allowed him to subject juridical and abstract 
notions of equality to a severe critique, and to understand them as 
functions of a society in which inequality in the enjoyment of material 
things is in part produced by the fictions of equality before the law.    
Petits riens and L’Utopie must be read together as explorations of the 
same thing from two different perspectives. If it indeed appears that 
“the road leading to the land of nowhere had itself been lost and even 
this loss itself remained unnoticed,” Macherey shows us that this path 
is to be found among the things that make up everyday life, in the 
movements by which bodies diverge ever so slightly from the 
prescribed routes, in the instant of hesitation before the completion 
of a required motion, in the complicity of a glance, in impertinent 
silences or in distant voices that pass from nonsense to sense and 
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back again in an instant. But where can such a path lead? If Utopia 
has been rendered inaccessible, if it is strictly speaking to be found 
nowhere, this is surely because it is everywhere, as immanent as it is 
transcendent, the beyond incarnate in the hic et nunc, a critique of 
the present already actualized, prevented by nothing but a fragile 
balance of forces from possessing, that is, inundating and 
transforming, the real.   
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